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I. INTRODUCTION
It is the drama of David and Goliath as well as David versus David on the
water. West African fishing communities operating in small boats compete
regularly with both multinational industrial trawlers and each other for an
ever-dwindling fish supply. Marine resource scarcity is becoming the new
reality. The presence of multilaterally negotiated legal rights to fish coupled
with the absence of law enforcement across the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) has created a dwindling fish supply across West Africa. In some of
these countries, including Liberia, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and Ghana,
non-governmental organizations estimate that nearly one-third of the total
catch being taken is illegal.2 When you add in the assumption that fishing
vessels with licenses may be overfishing without legal repercussions, there
are tremendous pressures on an increasingly fragile resource for which there
is no immediate substitute.
The problem of illegal fishing is not unique to West Africa, but because
the issues of food security and ecological vulnerability are particularly
pronounced in this part of the world, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
(IUU) fishing requires a rapid, multi-scale national, regional, and
international response to avert potentially devastating stock collapses.
Worldwide fisheries are in crisis, with insufficient international interventions
to restore commercial fisheries.3 While there has been some international
attention given to restoring global high seas fisheries and improving regional
fisheries management, there is an even more pressing need for rapid local
interventions to protect subsistence fishers, primarily in developing
countries, from the consequences of multinational industrial fishing that
competes directly or indirectly with the subsistence fishing communities in
EEZs.4 Mirroring the land-grabbing by large agribusiness in Africa, a
number of non-African vessels—including European and Chinese fishing
fleets—are presently engaged in ocean-grabbing, reaping large benefits from
2
John Vidal, West African Fishing Communities Drive Off ‘Pirate’ Fishing Trawlers,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/oct/11/west-africafishing-pirate-trawlers.
3
Sharon LaFraniere, Europe Takes Africa’s Fish, and Boatloads of Migrants Follow, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at A1 (describing the African fisheries crisis and noting that
“[o]verfishing is hardly limited to African waters”).
4
MARIANO IOSSA ET AL., SELFISH EUROPE: HOW THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENTS WOULD FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECLINE OF FISH STOCKS AND
EXACERBATE THE FOOD CRISIS IN SENEGAL 14 (2008), available at http://www.actionaid.org/
sites/files/actionaid/selfish_europe.pdf (noting that the European Union can only supply 50%
of its current internal demand for fish from its own waters).

38

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:35

resources that are in the waters of other States without the host coastal
State’s citizens receiving any direct benefits.5
Illegal fishing in the West African region is a matter of fundamental
human rights. Across the globe, oceanic artisanal fishing plays an essential
role in promoting food security, with artisanal fishers catching about 30
million tons of fish.6 The fish caught by these artisanal fishers are the
primary source of protein in many communities, particularly those in
developing countries. Unfortunately, the artisanal fishing communities in
some places are in direct competition with industrial fishing operations.
Those operators collectively catch approximately 30 million tons of fish for
food and 35 million tons of marine biomass for fish oil and fish meal, while
discarding 15 million tons of by-catch.7 This clash between artisanal fishing
and industrial operations is particularly evident in West Africa.
But all is not well with the health of West African coastal fisheries either.
This is not merely a tale of exploitation by foreign fleets. Overfishing
practices by industrial fleets have exacerbated overfishing by coastal
fishermen, leading to dwindling catches. The story of the Senegalese
fisherman Niadye Diouf is representative of this disheartening trend. He said
that in 2008 it would take five times as many local boats to catch what was
one available in a single local boat.8 Local fishermen are unable to
sustainably manage formerly productive fisheries because of the current
conditions of the coastal fishery stocks in West African waters. In response
to this looming crisis of scarce resources, one civil society group working in
the area has called for “a permanent suspension of the [foreign] fisheries
agreements, the imposition of biological rest periods and reinforced
surveillance of territorial waters.”9
This Article will focus on the recurring food security challenges facing
West African States whose waters are being regularly exploited by distant
water fishing vessels in ongoing, legalized ocean-grabs. Part II examines the
conditions of West African fisheries that have led to a state of scarcity,
5
Anastasia Telesetsky, Resource Conflicts over Arable Land in Food Insecure States:
Creating an United Nations Ombudsman Institution to Review Foreign Agricultural Land
Leases, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 283, 315 (Ger.) (concluding that foreign leases of
“agricultural land in food insecure countries is an emerging case of elite resource capture that
threatens human security”).
6
Christopher Pala, Billions in Subsidies Prop Up Unsustainable Overfishing, INTER PRESS
SERVICE (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/11/billions-in-subsidies-prop-up-unsus
tainable-overfishing/.
7
Id.
8
LaFraniere, supra note 3.
9
IOSSA ET AL., supra note 4, at 15.
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including the active and legalized presence of foreign fishing fleets and the
under-enforcement of domestic laws designed to manage both foreign and
artisanal fishers. This section addresses two encouraging regional legal
developments that could alleviate pressures on fishery resources. Part III
explores the tension between States’ obligations under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which requires them to allow other States
to exploit marine resource surpluses, and the competing obligation to satisfy
their populations’ human right-to-food. Part IV suggests that governments
must re-engage fishery problems at different scales. It proposes several
government policy options that prioritize restoration of fishery resources for
artisanal fishing communities, including new financing for enforcement and
the creation of new frameworks of user rights for coastal fisheries.
II. WEST AFRICAN FISHERIES AND THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS OF
MARINE RESOURCE SCARCITY
West African fisheries are among the most threatened fisheries in the
world because they have become both the overused “safety net” for local
food security and a target of the global pursuit for economically valuable
commodities.10 In coastal Africa, fish represent one of the most important
sources of dietary protein. In fact, in some African countries such as the
Congo, C te d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Ghana, the population obtains almost half
of its animal protein from fish.11 But it is not fishers from West African
coastal States alone who are capturing fish within West African waters. In
the past couple of decades, distant water fishing fleets have created
conditions of physical scarcity for local coastal fishing communities.
A. Distant Water Fishing Vessels and Marine Resource Exploitation
Having overfished European waters to the point where stocks are no
longer healthy, the European Union through the European Commission has
been negotiating special access agreements with a number of Western
African States for European flagged vessels to supply fish valued at $1.75

10
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, U.N. DOC. A/67/268 (Aug. 8, 2012) (by Oliver De Schutter) (“[Fishing] plays
an important safety net function, however. In times of crisis, often caused by failing
agriculture, conflict or recession, fishing provides important part-time or temporary income or
relatively free food.”).
11
Achieving Poverty Reduction Through Responsible Fisheries: Lessons from West and
Central Africa, FAO FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE TECHNICAL PAPER 513, at 48 (1980).
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billion to the European market.12 The earliest versions of these partnerships
provided fish to European actors at greatly reduced prices with only minimal
benefit flowing to the West African States and almost no benefit trickling
down to the artisanal fishing communities. The access rights that Europe
purchased were an example of a “bad subsidy” that allowed for excess
fishing capacity to be transferred from the North to developing countries’
waters.
The European Union continues to provide payments of
approximately 400 million dollars to African States to benefit fleets
primarily from Spain, France, and Portugal.13 Countries such as Mauritania,
which depend on these payments from the European Commission, continue
to grant fishing rights to foreign vessels in spite of reduced fish stocks.14
Particularly problematic is the parallel nature of a number of these
agreements. For example, the European Union in the early 1980s entered
into agreements with Senegal, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.15 Located in
close proximity to each other, these countries share a number of fish stocks,
but each independently sets its own total allowable number of catches for its
EEZ. In competition with one another for economic advantage, each State
independently offered generous allocations of the shared stock such that their
cumulative allocations exceeded an ecologically appropriate catch limit.
Other countries such as China also deploy distant water fishing vessels in
West African waters under private joint venture agreements as part of a
transnational economic network.16 These agreements are frequently signed
by private fishing companies with national governments.17 China has

12
THOMAS BINET, FISHING FOR COHERENCE IN WEST AFRICA: POLICY COHERENCE IN THE
FISHERIES SECTOR IN SEVEN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 13 (2008).
13
U. Rashid Sumaila et al., A Bottom-Up Re-Estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies, 12
J. BIOECONOMICS 201, 211 (2010) (“Spain has been particularly successful with the EU
assistance subsidies for joint ventures, with over 250 vessels in 22 countries and catching up
to reaching 190,000 tonnes.”).
14
LaFraniere, supra note 3.
15
Council Regulation 971/83, Agreement Between the European Economic Community
and the Government of the Revolutionary People’s Republic of Guinea on Fishing off the
Guinean Coast, 1983 O.J. (L111) 2; Council Regulation 2213/80, Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1980 O.J. (L226) 34; Council Regulation
2212/80, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European
Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal, 1980 O.J. (L226) 17.
16
Ahmed Khan, U. Rashid Sumaila, Reg Watson, Gordon Munro & Daniel Pauly, The
Nature and Magnitude of Global Non-Fuel Fisheries Subsidies, in CATCHING MORE BAIT: A
BOTTOM-UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 5, 23–24 (U. Rashid Sumaila &
D. Pauly eds., 2006).
17
Antonius Gagern & Jeroen van den Bergh, A Critical Review of Fishing Agreements with
Tropical Developing Countries, 38 MARINE POL’Y 375, 378 (2013) (explaining that
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bilateral fisheries access agreements with a number of West African States
including Guinea-Bissau (1984), Guinea (1985), Senegal (1985), and Sierra
Leone (1985), providing Chinese vessels broad access to West African
coastal waters.18 In 2011, in spite of declines in global fisheries, the Chinese
Agriculture Ministry observed that the catch attributed to Chinese fishing
fleets in West Africa rose 14% in volume and 41% in value.19
The foreign access agreements have resulted in what might be
characterized as a legalized form of ocean-grabbing. Industrial fishing
vessels operating under various bilateral agreements and contracts with the
coastal States in prime fisheries such as the Guinea Current have been
encroaching on artisanal fishing grounds communities leading to ongoing
conflicts.20 As industrial trawling activity increases, the artisanal fish harvest
is decreasing for coastal populations.21 While the European Union continues
to negotiate agreements with West African States with the justification that
the EU is contributing to positive conditions for human development by
offering funds for fishing infrastructure, fishing rights for foreign vessels
continue to be sold at less than the value of the resource, and little valueadded fish processing is actually taking place in Western Africa.22
In addition to the licensed foreign vessels fishing under foreign fishing
access agreements or joint venture operations, rampant illegal activity also
occurs within the West African coastal waters, spurred in part by the coastal
States’ lack of political will and enforcement capacity. Of the seventy
foreign trawlers that were flying a Chinese flag within Sierra Leone’s waters
in 2005, a number of the Chinese vessels are suspected of IUU fishing.23
agreements between private industry and West African governments are common for South
Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese fleets).
18
Tabitha Mallory, China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and
Implications, 38 MARINE POL’Y 103 (2013)
19
Chuin-Wei Yap & Sameer Mohindru, China’s Hunger for Fish Upsets Seas: Reach of
Massive Fleet Cuts Into Stock, Tests Ties on Opposite Side of the World, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,
2012, at A7.
20
GUINEA CURRENT LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEM, TRANSBOUNDARY DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS
39 (Feb. 2006).
21
K.A. Koranteng, Status of Demersal Fishery Resources on the Inner Continental Shelf off
Ghana, in THE GULF OF GUINEA LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEM: ENVIRONMENTAL FORCING AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES 261, 273 (J.M. McGlade et al. eds.,
2002).
22
Gagern & van den Bergh, supra note 17, at 378 (“Funds do not reach the intended
purposes, fish stocks are decreasing and the lives of fish workers in contacting states are
harder than ever.” (quoting SWEDISH SOCIETY FOR NATURE CONSERVATION, TO DRAW THE
LINE: EU FISHERIES AGREEMENTS IN WEST AFRICA 60 (2009))).
23
Mallory, supra note 18, at 103 (“In 2005, there were approximately 70 foreign trawlers
and sardine purse seiners in Sierra Leone’s waters.”); EQUAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, PIRATE
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B. Responsiveness of Domestic Law
Well-written laws alone have failed to create sufficient incentives to
conserve marine resources. As this Article will describe, the law itself as
written, while not optimal in all regards, has sufficient conservation and
enforcement language to provide protection of marine resources. This
Article examines three fishery codes within West Africa to determine what
enforcement options are available under the law and whether additional legal
reforms may be needed to strengthen the deterrence component of the law, or
whether resources and attention should be focused on enforcement of preexisting laws. The first and second codes, from Gambia and Liberia
respectively, have been revised recently and incorporate best management
practices into the revised texts. The third case, the code and regulations of
Sierra Leone that date from the mid-1990s, reflects a transitional code that
might be revised, particularly in relation to the relatively low penalties for
violations. Ultimately, though, it is clear that good law does not translate
into sufficient enforcement.
1. Gambia
The fishing industry is clearly an important economic sector in Gambia: it
is the third largest production sector in Gambia and it accounts for 12% of
the country’s GDP.24 Concerned that the 1991 code was not addressing the
relationship between national fisheries and poverty reduction, Gambia
revised its fisheries laws in 1997 to better address resource demands by both
local and foreign fishing vessels.25 Fishery management decisions appear to
be concentrated largely in the hands of one decision-maker, raising
accountability concerns particularly in relation to allocations for foreign
fleets.26 The Secretary of State is empowered to decide the total allowable
catch (TAC), or total allowable level of fishing effort, for each fish stock as
well as the allocations associated with either the TAC or fishing effort
level.27 The same individual may also enter into bilateral or multilateral
access agreements with other States or associations representing foreign

FISHING EXPOSED: THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL FISHING IN WEST AFRICA AND THE EU 7
(2012).
24
Food and Agriculture Organization, Information on Fisheries Management in the
Republic of Gambia (2001), http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/GMB/body.thm.
25
Fisheries Act (2007) 20 O.G. (Supp. C) (Gambia).
26
Id. §§ 11–12.
27
Id.
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fishing vessel owners to provide an allocation of fishing rights.28 This same
individual may also designate enforcement officers who are not Gambian but
are authorized to enforce the Gambian Fisheries Act.29 The revised act also
provides the Secretary of State with the power to require vessel monitoring
systems on boats operating in Gambian waters.30 There are no apparent
statutory checks or balances on the Secretary’s powers under the Fisheries
Act.31
In addition, the Secretary may designate a special management area to
zone for “community based fisheries management” as well as to support
“artisanal or subsistence fishing operations.”32 In principle, this is a positive
development focused on meeting the needs of coastal communities. What
groups are addressed in this management measure has the potential to be
ambiguous.
The term “community based fisheries management” is
unfortunately undefined in the act.33 “[A]rtisanal fishing” is simply
described as fishing, including commercial fishing, with “motorized or nonmotorized canoes,” and the term “canoe” is undefined.34 “Local fishing
vessel” is defined in the code to require a genuine link between Gambia, the
owner of the vessel, and the profits of the fishing activity.35 There is no
indication in the law as to whether artisanal fishing includes only local
fishermen using their canoes to fish for local markets or whether it also
includes regional fishermen who are hired by foreign vessels to fish in the
special areas and supply the fish to the foreign fleets.36
The Gambian code requires licensing for both local and foreign fishing
vessels.37 A failure to comply with the code results in a fine between five
and thirty-five million dalasis ($152,000–$760,000), a prison term between
five and ten years, or some combination of the two.38 In addition to these
penalties, the court may order forfeiture of the vessel used to commit an
offense and any fish caught illegally.39 The Gambian Director of Fisheries
can refuse entry to foreign vessels that are believed to be in violation of
28

Id. § 38(1).
Id. § 2 (referring to fisheries officers, police officers, Gambian Navy officers, and
customs officers); id. § 70(1).
30
Id. § 106(2)(q).
31
See id.
32
Id. § 14(1).
33
Id.
34
Id. § 2.
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
Id. §§ 35–37 (local licensing provisions); id. §§ 38–42 (foreign licensing provisions).
38
Id. § 39(9)
39
Id. § 84(1).
29
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international conservation and management measures.40 Under the Fisheries
Act, the authorized fishery officers have the power to seize boats that are in
Gambian waters in violation of international conservation and management
measures.41 The director may require onboard fishing observers for certain
fisheries that are subject to a foreign access agreement.42 Fines and prison
sentences are levied and assigned for the illegal use of industrial driftnets,
leaving non-biodegradable items in fishery waters, fishing with explosives or
poisons, dumping fish processing waste, and willfully damaging or
destroying fishing vessels or gear.43
2. Liberia
Liberia’s population is also heavily dependent on fish, with artisanal
fishers competing both directly and indirectly with a $12 million illegal
fishing industry that is spearheaded by distant water industrial fishing
vessels.44 In 2010, the Liberian government promulgated a new set of
regulations to protect its fishery resources.45 Like in the Gambian code, the
Liberian code defines “artisanal fishing,” as “small scale commercial
fishing” using motorized or non-motorized fishing vessels or canoes that are
sixty feet or shorter.46 It is unclear whether foreign industrial vessels can
contract with artisanal fishers to support their export-oriented activities.47
Artisanal fishers are expected to have licenses in order to fish within the
inshore exclusion zone.48
Unlike Gambia, Liberia does not require evidence of an access agreement
in order to issue licenses for foreign fishing vessels. It does require the
posting of a performance bond “as a financial guarantee for the fulfillment of
all obligations arising out of the license . . . including potential costs relating
to rescue, other cost recovery and fines, penalties or compensation for
40

Id. § 41(2)(a).
Id. § 73(2).
42
Id. § 79(2).
43
Id. §§ 62, 64–67.
44
WORLD BANK, PREVENTION FIRST: THE WORLD BANK’S APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIME (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPIC
S/ENVIRONMENT/EXTBIODIVERSITY/0,,contentMDK:23264957~pagePK:210058~piPK
:210062~theSitePK:400953,00.html.
45
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, REGULATIONS RELATING TO FISHERIES, FISHING AND
RELATED ACTIVITIES FOR THE MARINE FISHERIES SECTOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA (2010),
available at http://liberiafisheries.net/sites/default/files/pdf/fisheries_reg-final.pdf.
46
Id. § 1.
47
See id.
48
Id. §§ 6, 14(1)(c).
41
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violations against these Regulations.”49 Liberia has a number of reporting
laws that apply to “any ‘industrial fishing vessel[ ]’ ” which is defined
broadly as “decked fishing vessel with an internal engine with a capacity
greater than 100bhp that is greater than ninety feet in length.”50 Liberian law
is unclear as to whether the references to “industrial fishing vessels” are only
to Liberian flagged vessels or whether it also refers to foreign flagged
industrial vessels. Reading the code as a whole, it appears to suggest that the
regulations impose only limited requirements on foreign flagged industrial
vessels.51
Liberian fishing inspectors have the power to seize vessels that may have
been engaged in illegal fishing as well as any illegally obtained cargo.52 The
inspectors are empowered to use warning shots or devices to impede the
propulsion of the vessel.53 Observers may be appointed to report on
scientific monitory, and compliance of vessels with marine conservation
laws.54 The Coordinator has the discretion as to whether to require observers
to be deployed onboard ships, as well as whether a fishing vessel operator
must participate in a vessel monitoring system.55 Penalties range from
$10,000 for a failure to declare quantity of fish onboard to $1,000,000 for
fishing without a license.56 Criminal sanctions are also possible, but
imprisonment is not a possibility for foreign crew in conformity with Article
73(3) of the Law of the Sea.57
3. Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Fisheries Decree and Regulations date from 1994.58 As
with the Gambian and Liberian laws, Sierra Leone recognizes the delicate
49

Id. § 17.
Id. § 1.
51
Id. §§ 37–39 (requiring foreign vessels to provide information before arriving in port to
be used to determine whether IUU fishing has occurred and submit to possible inspections).
52
Id. at 47(2).
53
Id. § 47(3).
54
Id. § 48(1).
55
Id. §§ 49, 55.
56
Id. § 58.
57
Id. §§ 58(8), 59; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 73(3), Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (providing that “[c]oastal state penalties for violations of fisheries
laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the
absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal
punishment”).
58
The Fisheries (Management and Development) Decree, 1994 (Supplement to the Sierra
Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXV dated 8th December 1994) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Fisheries
50
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position of artisanal fishing communities.59 The artisanal fishing vessels are
required to carry registration but not to have a license for fishing.60 Local
fishing vessels, defined as any vessel either fully or more than 50% owned or
capitalized by Sierra Leoneans, are required to have licenses.61 All foreign
fishing vessels must operate with a valid license based on an access
agreement negotiated between Sierra Leone and foreign governments.62
The Director of Fisheries has monitoring, control, surveillance, and
enforcement capabilities, including the power to board and inspect vessels.63
The fines and penalties collected for violations of the fishery laws help fund
this work.64 A captain’s failure to provide information on export statistics
can result in either a fine of ten million leones (approximately $2,313) or an
imprisonment term of two years.65 Violations of fishery regulations result in
$5,000 fines for foreign vessels or foreign citizens and $1,000 fines for local
fishing vessels or Sierra Leone’s citizens.66
4. Reflections on the Effectiveness of the Domestic Fishery Codes as Law
in Protecting Scarce Resources
Overall, the codes seem to moderately protect the marine resources within
the EEZ by requiring state-issued licenses for foreign fishing vessels,
imposing penalties for failures to comply with the codes, and creating a
system for monitoring. Some additional refinements of these codes may be
possible in terms of designating who is an artisanal fisher, rather than an
industrial commercial fisher, in order to extend greater protection from the
State to artisanal fishing communities. All of the codes might be revised to
rescind artisanal fishing protection for fishermen engaged in fishing activities
on behalf of foreign or national industrial fishing companies. Sierra Leone
should consider adding provisions to require artisanal fishing vessels to carry
some form of fishing licenses to ensure that artisanal fishing protects marine
resources.

Decree]; The Fisheries (Management and Development) Decree 1994, The Fisheries
Regulations 1995 [hereinafter Sierra Leone Fisheries Regulations].
59
Sierra Leone Fisheries Regulations, Part II(3).
60
Id. § (4)(1).
61
Sierra Leone Fisheries Decree, supra note 58, §§ 15–20, 105.
62
Id. § 22.
63
Id. § 63.
64
Id. § 61.
65
Id. § 100(4).
66
Sierra Leone Fisheries Regulation, supra note 58, § 42.
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5. Enforcement: The Missing Ingredient?
The problem for West Africa is not the content of its written laws.
Policymakers have recognized the crisis of the modern fisheries and have
done something conceptually to address it by separating artisanal fishing
concerns from the foreign fishing industry. Practically, the crisis for West
African State fisheries is one of repetitive under-enforcement of existing
laws. While punitive laws exist for all of the States reviewed, these codes
remain under-enforced due to a lack of enforcement resource capacity, a lack
of political will, or just plain corruption.67 Based on a review of international
newspapers in legal databases, few enforcement actions are being reported
by any of the West African coastal States.68 Flag States do not appear to be
pursuing robust monitoring efforts of their vessels, resulting in coastal States
being defrauded.69 The Senegalese Minister of Fisheries and Maritime
Affairs explained that even though he has information about vessels illegally
fishing, his department lacks the resources to react.70 Only States such as
South Africa and Namibia have the resources to maintain a consistent
enforcement program.71 In spite of valiant efforts by some States to seek
prosecutions of illegal fishing, the regional response to resource degradation
has traditionally been poorly coordinated.72 This may be slowly changing,
with some of the States appearing poised to reverse the current trends.
C. Promising Developments in West Africa to Address the Conditions of
Marine Resource Scarcity
There is reason for hope. Many of the most affected States in West
Africa are no longer in denial that there is a resource crisis. States, such as
Senegal, that formerly gave distant water fishing vessels access to their
67

LaFraniere, supra note 3 (describing a situation in Guinea Bissau where in 2005 there
were no patrol boats, twelve fishing ministers in eight years, government observers were
easily paid off, and where in 2008 the EU was given the right to fish for shrimp, tuna, and
octopus in already depleted waters).
68
The terms searched for were “West Africa” or individual West African state names and
“fishery enforcement.”
69
RamsNeil Ramsden, Starkist Parent Dongwon Accused of IUU Fishing, Fraud,
UNDERCURRENT NEWS (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.undercurrentnews.com/2013/
03/12/starkist-parent-dongwon-accused-of-iuu-fishing-fraud/#.UUYr93FbyJU.
70
West Africa Aims to Stop Illegal Fishing, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 8, 2013.
71
Mary Kimani, Safeguarding Africa’s Fishing Waters, Regional Action Needed to Stop
Illegal Trawlers, AFRICA RENEWAL (July 2009), available at http://www.un.org/africarenewal/
magazine/july-2009/safeguarding-africa%E2%80%99s-fishing-waters.
72
EQUAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, supra note 23, at 19–24.
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waters are now retracting licenses and raising the international alarm about
the condition of their fisheries.73 In 2012, Senegal rescinded twenty-nine
fishing licenses for foreign trawlers and demanded that these vessels offload
their catches before leaving Senegalese waters.74 This response was the
product of great frustration by the Senegalese ministries whose waters were
essentially being colonized by foreign vessels. In 2006, even though Senegal
had terminated its fishery access agreements with the EU, Senegal’s waters
continued to be fished by vessels from Russia, Lithuania, Morocco, Ukraine,
and other flags of convenience States whose vessels continued their
destructive fishing practices.75
In order to provide a clear declaration of what the rights and obligations
of States within West African waters are, the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission composed of Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania, Senegal, and Sierra Leone has requested an advisory opinion
from the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.76 ITLOS has taken the
request under advisement and entered the request as Case No. 21.77
In spite of these hopeful developments, there remain inherent legal
tensions within West African States between meeting basic needs of citizens
through ensuring access to food resources and meeting basic needs of
citizens through national development schemes, including the bilateral
Fishery Partnership Agreements and the joint development projects
supported by foreign investment. The following section looks specifically at
the collision between the State’s obligation to protect the human right to food
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John Vidal, Senegal Revokes Licences of Foreign Fishing Trawlers, GUARDIAN (May 4,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/04/senegal-revokes-licences-foreign-f
ishing-vessels.
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Id.
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Id.; Flags of Convenience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/flag_of_convenience (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (defining flag of convenience as
“registry of a merchant ship under a foreign flag in order to profit from less restrictive
regulations”).
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Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea Receives a Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Sub-Regional
Fisheries Commission (Mar. 28, 2013) (noting that the request has been made pursuant to the
2012 Convention on the Determination of the Minimal Conditions for Access and
Exploitation of Marine Resources within the Maritime Areas under Jurisdiction of the
Member States of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, which is an initial effort by the
parties to harmonize fishing standards for a common fishing policy).
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Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission,
Order 2013/2 of May 24, 2013, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/
cases/case_no.21/C21_ord_2013-2_24.05_E.pdf (noting that the case has been docketed as
case number 21).
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and the State’s obligation to allow other States access to EEZ waters for
optimal utilizations of marine resources.
III. THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA:
COMPETING STATE OBLIGATIONS
The right to food is a fundamental human right articulated in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It provides
that everyone has the right to “adequate food . . . and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions.”78 As the UN understands the right, it is
“inseparable from social justice, requiring the adoption of appropriate
economic, environmental and social policies, at both the national and
international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and the fulfillment
of all human rights for all.”79 In 2012, the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food explored the relationship between the right to food and fishing and
concluded that current fishing practices may jeopardize a State’s ability to
ensure adequate food for its population.80 He called for States to assess
whether their policies are interfering with “existing access to adequate food”
and to ensure that “enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of
their access to adequate food.”81 He specifically called for States to “search
for arrangements that preserve the long-term (environmental) sustainability
of fishing, including . . . reducing overfishing and conserving fish habitats,
while concurrently improving the incomes of small-scale fishing
communities . . . .”82
The West African fisheries present a curious case when examined
simultaneously through the lens of the right to food and the Law of the Sea’s
Article 62. The West African coastal States that depend on fish resources
have a clear legal right to fish in their waters in order to meet their citizens’
rights to food. But there may be a legal question as to the temporal nature of
the right to food. Do States have a right to withhold foreign access to food
resources under their jurisdiction when they would otherwise have a
quantitative surplus where the total allowable catch is set at the maximum
sustainable yield based on assumptions about industrial fishing practices?
78

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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On the one hand, it appears that developing states may have the ability to
protect future generations since the Law of the Sea allows for States to
control access depending on “the significance of the living resources of the
area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national
interests.”83 West African States can argue for an exclusive right to fisheries
in their EEZ because of strong national interests in creating a foundation for
current and future food security. For many of the coastal States with large
and growing populations along the coast, maintaining a healthy population of
fish and seafood for harvesting is a key aspect of avoiding shocks of famine
and the unpredictable impacts of climate change. Adapting to climate
change may require a shift from relying heavily on agricultural products for
nutrition to relying more on fish products84—especially given predictions
that climate change may reduce per-capita calorie availability in West Africa,
where a large proportion of the population is already calorie deficient.85
In contrast to Article 62(3), which accords coastal States some discretion
on how they will provide access to living resources in their EEZ, Article
62(2) of the Law of the Sea suggests that coastal States lacking capacity “to
harvest the entire allowable catch” have an affirmative obligation “through
agreements or other arrangements” to “give other States access to the surplus
of the allowable catch.”86 This obligation is conditioned since coastal States
who may not have the capacity to “harvest the entire allowable catch” in
their EEZ should also take into consideration “the need to minimize
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the
zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of
stocks.”87 Applying this factor, a West African State might continue to allow
distant water fishing vessels to fish within its waters because these vessels
have been fishing in the West African waters since before many of these
West African States ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.88 The question
83
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of whether this is a reasonable reading depends on what the drafters of the
Law of the Sea meant by “habitually fished”—some of the distant water
fishing industrial trawlers have been operating for at least a decade in
African waters.89
It seems counterintuitive that in a time of scarcity, countries that have
maintained their food resources through reduced fishing efforts and who now
have a surplus in terms of total allowable catch may have an obligation to
share this surplus with States that have historically overexploited their
waters. Article 62(2), with its affirmative language requiring that coastal
States without harvest capacity “shall . . . give other States access to the
surplus” seems to suggest support for the continuation of the EU fishing
program in Africa.90 As tides turn and natural capital becomes valued not
just for its consumptive use but also for its contribution to ecosystem
services, countries hosting some of the world’s last great fish stocks and still
healthy biodiversity are understandably reluctant to continue opening their
waters to foreign vessels even if they have permitted industrial fishing in the
past.91 What arises is a collision between States’ obligations to ensure the
progressive realization of the right to food and States’ obligations under the
Law of the Sea to provide access to marine “surplus” below the quantified
level of total allowable catches.92 The scarcity of marine fishery resources
creates a race to fish by industrial fleets and artisanal fishermen, both of
whom see their livelihoods disappearing.93
IV. LONG-TERM POLICIES TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHT TO FOOD
IN WEST AFRICA
In order to shape an appropriate policy response to the overexploitation of
West African fisheries, greater focus needs to be placed on the institutions
that are socially engaged in both promoting fishing and protecting fisheries
and the conflict between the set of rules provided by such institutions. Nobel
89
See generally Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Islamic
Republic of Mauritania on Fishing off the Coast of Mauritania: Protocol Setting Out Fishing
Opportunities and Financial Compensation for the Period 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1990, Eur.Mauritania, Oct. 24, 1987, Official Journal L. 302 24.10.1987, pp. 26–35.
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Law of the Sea, supra note 57, art. 62(2).
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available at http://worldoceanreview.com/wp-content/downloads/wor2/WOR2_english.pdf.
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SLIDESHOW: Illegal Fishing Hits Fish Stocks, Livelihoods in Sierra Leone, IRIN (Dec.
6, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96980/slideshow-illegal-fishing-%20hits-fish-stock
s-livelihoods-in-sierra-leone.
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Prize winner Elinor Ostrom has proposed and theorized a conceptual
framework called “institutional analysis and development” to explain how
social institutions can change the incentives of how individuals and groups
act.94 One area of particular interest for Professor Ostrom and her
collaborators has been the identification of variables that impact institutions.
One such “exogenous variable” with bearing on the case study of West
African fisheries is the “concept of rules.”95 Drawing on work by political
scientist Max Black, Ostrom identifies four types of possible rules: binding
regulations; instructions (e.g., formulas); moral precepts; and physical laws
or principles.96 All of these types of rules contribute to creating “shared
understandings” regarding what is “required, prohibited, or permitted.”97
What becomes apparent in reflecting on the current situation in the West
African fisheries is that there is no uniform set of rules that applies to all of
the fishery actors. Fisheries scientists weighing in on the physical laws
suggest that the fisheries are overexploited. Meanwhile, West African
nations are creating binding regulations with European partners that fail to
address the fact that most of the West African countries lack the diplomatic
leverage to persuade the States whose nationals or vessels are over-fishing to
cease and desist from both environmentally and socially damaging fishery
practices. The distant water fishing vessels comply with rules as practical
economic instructions with the primary rule seeming to be: “A vessel may
fish within a region until there are low yields in the net and then the vessel
should move on to the next fishery.” By contrast, the coastal artisanal fishers
living in communities of fisherfolk have complex moral precepts and
principles that guide their actions, including cultural mores and norms.
With conflicting sets of rules in practice for the major actors in the West
African fisheries—the industrial trawlers, the coastal artisanal fishers, the
distant water fishing nations, the flags of convenience nations that register
some of the trawlers, and the coastal States—it is unsurprising that there are
tensions among the actors. By acknowledging that players consider
themselves to be playing by different sets of rules and not simply by the laws
of the coastal States, the international Law of the Sea, or human rights laws
like the right to food, it becomes possible to identify strategies that may
encourage longer-term intervention at a scale most likely to result in
appropriate responses to growing conditions of scarcity.
94
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The West African fisheries problem is a multi-scale problem. It is largely
an international problem caused by historically inadequate fishery
conservation efforts in developed States in Europe, aggressive food security
strategies in developing States in Asia, and revenue generation for countries
choosing to flag any vessel that will pay the registration fees. It is also a
regional problem, with a lack of coordination among West African States to
eliminate destructive fishing practices. Finally, the fisheries problems are a
local problem, with local fishing communities unsustainably competing for
scarce resources. What is needed is a multi-scale approach to fisheries
governance. Rather than the current efforts to pursue reforms that fail to
address the complexities of managing national fisheries for both a global
market and for local consumption, reforms need to be initiated across the
supply and demand chain with a focus on the most vulnerable populations
that cannot substitute other sources of protein. The World Bank has called
for a policy response at multiple levels, observing at its conference “The
Hidden Harvests” that “[c]ontrol of industrial fleets in coastal areas
combined with responsible practices by small-scale fishing communities can
recover these economic rents [global economic losses of $50 billion
annually] and maintain the integrity of fishery dependent communities.”98
Given the gravity of the situation in West Africa, where the seas are being
literally plundered, there have been multiple calls for action by civil society
groups and most recently by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food.99 The remainder of this section provides three policy proposals for
coastal States to immediately address the ongoing tensions that have
emerged surrounding the ocean-grabbing practices of some foreign fleets and
unsustainable coastal fishery practices. These proposals are offered as
possible “rules” to “create shared understandings” regarding what is
“required, prohibited, or permitted” in order to ensure a reasonably stable
future for the West African EEZ fisheries.100
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V. POLICY PROPOSALS
A. West African States Should Temporarily Close Their EEZ to Foreign and
Domestic Industrial Operations until Effective Compliance and Enforcement
Eliminates Illegal Fishing Operations
Even though a moratorium on industrial fishing alone will not solve the
problems caused by over-fishing, a moratorium is still essential for two
reasons. First, it will permit threatened stocks to rebound by reducing
fishing effort and allowing for West African States to meet their obligations
under the Law of the Sea to “ensure through proper conservation and
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the
[EEZ] is not endangered by over-exploitation.”101 Second, it will allow
governments to assess what the overall status is of their marine resources,
including both single stocks and shared stocks. Currently, there is a lack of
scientific data about many of the species in the West African waters because
the States do not have the internal resources to invest in marine scientific
research.
Some coastal regions of the world are in the process of imposing
moratoria on industrial fishing. For example, the U.S. state of North
Carolina has placed a ban within its three mile state jurisdiction on industrial
purse seine fishing for menhaden.102 In 2013, the Maldives announced that
all of its EEZ would by 2017 be designated as a biosphere marine reserve
where unsustainable industrial fishing would be prohibited.103 In other
regions of the world, including the Arctic, concerned scientists are calling for
a moratorium on industrial fishing because of the environmental
vulnerability of the region.104
Ideally, any moratorium would be applied regionally because a number of
the marine stocks are shared between West African States. There are a
variety of existing regional frameworks that States might rely upon to
provide needed governance to ensure the effectiveness of a moratorium.
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Including the FAO Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission,105 the UNEP
Regional Seas Programme for the West and Central African Region,106 and
the Ministerial Conference on African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean
(COMHAFAT).107 If an industrial moratorium is politically possible, it will
be important for States in the region to ensure that there are regionally
harmonized domestic laws on both industrial fishing and illegal fishing in
order to prevent the formation of havens for poor fishing practices.
A recurring issue is whether existing regional governance networks can
be politically robust enough to change the status quo in terms of resource
management when doing so may threaten foreign donor interests. For
example, in the most recent meeting of COMHAFAT, Japanese observers
played a prominent role in organizing the meeting and then seeking support
from COMHAFAT to oppose efforts to list Atlantic tuna under the
Convention in Trade on Endangered Species (CITES).108 This proposal was
supported by Monaco and the U.S. for conservation purposes.109
COMHAFAT countries agreed to support Japan in its opposition to an
Appendix I CITES listing that would prohibit commercial imports and
exports of the fish.110 This decision to support Japan’s position was
surprising in light of the ongoing crisis in domestic fisheries in a number of
105
See generally Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/srfc/en.
106
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1981, available at http://www.abidjanconvention.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=100&Itemid=200. A temporary industrial fishing moratorium might be possible
through the creation of specially protected area where the parties agree to “prohibit or control
any activity likely to have adverse effects on the species, ecosystems, or biological processes
in such areas.” Id.
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the West African States, which therefore might not reap much benefit from
Japan’s position.111
Even though some of the West African States participating in
COMHAFAT seemed to have been deferential in 2010 toward distant water
fishing nations’ interests, other regional institutions may be less willing to
support regional policies that run counter to long-term interests. For
example, the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) in March 2013
requested from the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) an
advisory opinion on the legality and liability associated with some of the
current flag state IUU fishing practices common in the West African region.
If ITLOS hears this case, the resulting opinion may provide the SRFC States
with the legal authority they need to demand better monitoring and
enforcement by flag States.
Before instituting any moratorium, it may be necessary to review
investment agreements to avoid any potential claims of investment
expropriation. If a West African State has agreed to certain terms within
bilateral investment treaties or specific access agreements for foreign vessels,
then foreign fishing fleets may have contractual or international investment
expropriation claims that they can bring in the case of a closure of a fishery
before the termination date of a fishing agreement. Where there is no access
agreement between a West African State and a distant water fishing State,
there would be no justified expectation on the part of individual fleet owners
to continue fishing in the EEZ waters of the coastal State.112 Since distant
water fishing is quite profitable and the parties that benefit are often
politically powerful, it may prove difficult to disentangle legitimate foreign
investment in the marine sector from the larger concerns of illegal fishing
that would be driving the moratorium effort. In addition, the diversity of
access agreements and bilateral investment agreements across the region
could prove to be a barrier to instituting effective regional responses to
illegal fishing in the region. West African States could proceed unilaterally,
however, to impose moratoria as long as State governments do not renew
foreign fishing licenses or access agreements. All of these considerations
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make a moratorium a challenging policy proposal, but one that should
alleviate some of the pressures on the fishing resources and provide what the
NGO ActionAid refers to as “biological rest periods.”113
Finally, if coastal States implement a moratorium, they must be in a
position to fully police their waters for possible violations of their fisheries
codes, such as over-exploitation of stocks. Without credible enforcement
capacity on the part of regional enforcement officials, both domestic and
foreign vessels will flout the moratorium. Given the paucity of enforcement
capacity in the region, enhancing enforcement will require more than simply
a reallocation of existing resources. It will require instead new investments
in enforcement mechanisms that will probably require international financing
and international capacity building for most of the countries in West Africa.
B. West African States Should Request Capital Investments from
International Financial Institutions Specifically for Fishery Enforcement
Operations
Presently, fishery enforcement efforts in West Africa lack basic
operational resources, including vessels for enforcement actions. Institutions
such as the World Bank are well-positioned to assist in coordination efforts
to supply basic enforcement infrastructure to States. A recent coordination
effort between the Isle of Man, the World Bank, and Sierra Leone has
resulted in increased enforcement in Sierra Leonean waters.114 In September
2012, the Isle of Man through its Overseas Aid Committee donated a former
customs boat to the government of Sierra Leone.115 Using World Bank
funding, the boat was retrofitted to operate as a fishing enforcement vessel
and staffed with two Isle of Man engineers to provide training on
maintenance and operations.116 In December 2012, the patrol vessel made its
first arrest.117
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In 2011, the World Bank provided additional funding of $2 million to
Liberia and $8 million to Sierra Leone through the West Africa Regional
Fisheries Program to assist the countries with three objectives: improving
local governance through a regional fisheries information network, tackling
illegal fishing, and improving local value for fish products through
infrastructure projects such as improved ports.118 While the first and third
objectives are valuable from a long-term economic development perspective,
the priority should be for funding to ensure that State fishery departments
have sufficiently fast and adequately maintained vessels available for their
enforcement officers so that they can act on intelligence about possible
illegal fishing rather than waiting for cooperation from the navy or other
departments with boats.119 While the World Bank has provided some
funding to support improved enforcement, it has been cautious in doing so
because of concerns that fishery surveillance activities may “overstep the
Bank’s mandate to finance only economic development activities.”120 At
least as it relates to the current proposal for improving enforcement
capabilities, this concern is misplaced. Any enforcement that will reduce the
pressure of either industrial or local irresponsible practices on coastal
fisheries will contribute to long-term local economic development.
Because operating patrol vessels is expensive, international investments
could also be used to support at-sea enforcement programs using
participatory surveillance by local fishing communities. One possible model
may be the bounty approach for combating anti-poaching. A system of
potential rewards could be structured for supplying information through a
hotline or other means that lead to the arrest of domestic and foreign IUU
fishers. In addition, there are also basic technologies emerging in the region
that international financial institutions can support which might enhance
national level enforcement efforts, including a Smartphone application called
“Trawler Spotter” that is being piloted in Liberia.121 “Trawler Spotter”
118
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provides an opportunity for citizens to notify national authorities where a
vessel is suspected of illegally trawling.122 Drones may also become useful
for combating illegal fishing.123
C. West African States Should Request International Coast Guards and
Naval Forces to Support Additional Enforcement Training as well as
Possible EEZ Resource Monitoring Assistance
Better equipment is only part of the long-term remedy for reducing
fishing effort. In addition to adequate equipment, there also need to be welltrained teams who are capable of responding to allegations of illegal fishing
or irresponsible fishing, since enforcement work on the water is both
potentially difficult and dangerous. The international community has
responded to provide assistance here. In recent years, there has been an
increase in capacity building exercises between West African States and
other States. In 2013, American and European naval officers provided
training in Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco,
Senegal, and Sierra Leone on patrolling for illegal fishing activity.124
Stronger navies and coast guards, particularly from States with current
access agreements, might, with the support and cooperation of West African
governments, contribute a regular presence in West African waters. In
addition to providing training, these navies could supply joint patrols during
particularly active parts of a fishing season or during those parts of a
breeding season when there are threats to juvenile fish. There is precedent
for such shared patrols between countries with strong navies and countries
lacking basic enforcement infrastructure: in February 2012, the United States
Coast Guard operating under a bilateral enforcement treaty conducted joint
EEZ fishery enforcement with the Republic of the Marshall Islands.125

122

Id.
Sean Dorney, Palau Looks to Drones to Monitor Fishing Ban, RADIO AUSTRALIA (Mar. 25,
2013), http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2013-03-25/palau-looks-to-drones-to-monit
or-fishing-ban/1106658.
124
Jennifer Lazuta, West Africa Aims to Stop Illegal Fishing, VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 8,
2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/west-africa-fishing/1618242.html.
125
Press Release, United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard to Conduct Joint Fisheries
Enforcement Mission with Republic of the Marshall Islands (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.uscg
news.com/go/doc/4007/1384271/Coast-Guard-to-conduct-joint-fisheries-enforcement-mission
-with-Republic-of-the-Marshall-Islands.
123

60

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:35

D. West African States Should Assign Use Rights to Fishing Communities
through Long-Term Concessions Based on Converting Restored Marine
Protected Areas to Territorial User Rights Fisheries
Overfishing in West African waters is not exclusively the fault of foreign
industrial fishing fleets. Poor management within the internal waters of
West African nations compounds the problem as community fishing groups
compete both with each other for already limited resources and with other
national interests such as coastal developers. Importing private property
mechanisms, such as the individual fishing quotas utilized in Norway, is
unlikely to be adaptable to the coastal regions of West Africa.126 Because
many of these fisheries are subsistence-based fisheries, the sale of individual
actionable or tradable permits would be unlikely to manage resources
effectively unless such a program was accompanied by rigid and possibly
inequitable enforcement against the poorest and most vulnerable members of
the community. Giving such permits away might be detrimental to the
sustainability of the underlying fish resources because the community
members may not value what is given away freely. It may simply lead to an
equally unenforceable system. West African and other nations with limited
enforcement resources need other options to protect scarce resources.
Before States can issue equitable fishing allocations among coastal
communities, West African fisheries and even some of the Asian subsistence
fisheries need long-term restoration efforts to help fisheries and marine
habitats recover from their current, overexploited conditions. In some
regions of the world, there is an exodus from fishing as a livelihood because
it is no longer considered a reliable source of food or income.127 This trend
is particularly concerning in States where a majority of the population’s
animal protein is obtained through fish. Assuming for the remainder of this
section that the problems with foreign industrial trawlers have been
satisfactorily resolved through increased enforcement in the outer reaches of
the exclusive economic zones and that foreign fleets are not using the
services of local fishermen to extract fish from the local coastal waters for
export, there are possibilities for re-creating sustainable coastal fisheries
through a combination of central government action and local fishery
management.
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This Article’s proposal would start with an investment in an employment
program for fishing communities targeted at restoring coastal habitats and
stocks so that this generation and future generations would be able to
eventually return to economically and ecologically viable fulltime fishing.
Rather than maintaining the status quo for local fishing effort, which is
reducing already limited stocks, the initial effort would begin with a
commitment from the central government of a nation reliant on subsistence
fishing to invest in stock recovery. Early efforts could be funded by
international aid.128 To achieve this goal would require some joint spatial
planning work between government ministries, including the Fishery
Ministry and the Environmental Ministry, and local communities to
designate a series of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). These regions would
be classified as recovering, partially recovered, or fully recovered depending
on the condition of the marine resources within the region. These MPAs
would be the foundation upon which a system of Territorial Use Rights in
Fisheries (TURFs) might be eventually constructed that could allocate
fishing rights to either fishing cooperatives or individual fishermen. The
larger the original MPAs are, the easier it may be to convert them into TURF
areas used and protected by multiple artisanal fishing groups in future years.
The idea behind designating the MPAs would be to provide a physical
location for restoration activities that would be funded by national
governments or by international donors.
Government agencies, in
collaboration with local communities and scientists, would decide whether to
actively or passively restore a given MPA and would set targets that would
define what is a “healthy” fishery capable of extraction for both local
consumption and possibly market export. After the MPAs have been
delineated and during the period of ongoing restoration, subsistence
fishermen would have the option of either applying for a territorial use right
within a “fully recovered” region or participating in active restoration
activities within a designated MPA. The two options are offered on the
theory that it will not be possible for all fishers to participate in a “fully
recovered” region and that certain fishers will need to “sit out” a number of
seasons of fishing until coastal areas have sufficiently recovered, either
through passive or active restoration efforts. The early stages of this project,
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which may require five to ten years of work depending on the deterioration
of the marine resources, will require sufficient subsidization to ensure that
fishers involved in restoration work will make comparable profits to those
engaged in fishing for the effort that they invest. The amount of
subsidization must not exceed what a given successful fishing individual
would make, because the program must not discourage individuals from
participating in the fishing activities needed to meet local nutritional needs.
For each fisher who chooses to participate in restoration work, they will
be assigned territorial use rights when the MPA that they are working on
restoring has fully recovered sufficient viable stocks to permit fishing. This
incentive is offered to incentivize careful restoration work by the individuals
and communities benefiting from the restoration. If restoration is successful
within the various MPAs, then at some point in the future, each fisher will be
entitled to a “territorial user right” within the former MPA that they helped to
restore. The MPA would then be relabeled as a TURF.
Subsistence fishing States have experience with TURF areas. In West
Africa, TURF areas have been relied upon as management tools associated
with beach seine netting.129 In pursuit of the goal of assigning equitable,
efficient, and sustainable marine property rights, the TURF areas designated
by the State could loosely coincide with the boundaries of a restored coastal
MPA. Within the TURF areas, members would have a number of property
rights, including the right of exclusion, the right to limit or control access to
the territory, and the present and future right to administer the TURF and
exploit resources within the territory. In terms of codifying legal access
rights, West African States interested in promoting TURF-based coastal
fisheries might look to other regions of the world to evaluate what types of
laws and regulations might be appropriate.130 In any case, a TURF should
provide livelihood opportunities for generations to come.
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The central government might set quota allocations for each of the
TURFs for any migratory fish or shared fish stocks to ensure more equitable
access to fish resources between TURF areas. Once these general quotas are
set, it would be up to the members assigned to TURF areas to decide whether
to have a formal or informal allocation system among members.131 These
allocations could be traded among TURFs through a cap and trade system so
that TURFs with a comparative advantage in certain types of fish may have
more opportunity to extract these fish. It would be in the interest of TURF
members to have a cooperative governance system for allocation and
conservation, because investing in a system of shared governance over the
territory might prevent unnecessary ecological decline in the TURF area. In
some countries within West Africa there may already exist legal entities able
to provide community governance within a government designated TURF
area. For example, in Gambia, the Fishery Act has established Gambian
Community Fisheries Centres that are organized in part around the “concerns
of communities living within the immediate environs of the area to be
declared as a Special Management Area.”132 The success of any of these
TURFs will depend on properly linking the TURFs spatially with already
existing customary fishing practices.
As long as the fishing communities remain meaningfully employed
through the restoration stages, this project should remain viable because
fishing communities already recognize the need to restrain their coastal
fishing takes. In response to NGO coordination efforts to promote
responsible fishing conditions, Assan Jallow, a Gambian fishermen, has
called for both government involvement in reviving the coastal fisheries and
concerted action from fellow fishermen: in his own words, he observed, “[i]f
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we do not stop catching the pelagic fish, we are not only posing a threat to
the fish population, but also endangering our own livelihood.”133
One of the advantages of TURF areas is that the future rights to
administer and exploit marine resources within an area should provide an
incentive for individuals or groups who are the holders of these rights to selfenforce fishery management measures. As the Food and Agriculture
Organization noted in a position paper,
An additional likely advantage is that a localized TURF area
provides both the opportunity and the incentive to manage the
resources within the territory. Since the owner of a TURF
(individual or community) has an exclusive right to future
products, it will be in his (or its) interest to ensure the flow of
future products. This would facilitate the imposition of
management measures as well as the task of enforcement.134
If a group of fishers with existing rights to fish within a TURF area failed
to maintain certain conditions of ecosystem health within the area, it could
trigger a previously agreed upon set of the thresholds based on certain
baseline characteristics. If a given set of thresholds is triggered, a TURF
area might return to the status of an MPA with the loss of use rights. The
fishers would then have the obligation to either abandon their user rights to
the government for a fixed market price or to participate again in restoration
efforts at a labor rate set by the government. For individuals who have been
assigned a TURF area from which it is not possible to obtain a subsistence
catch due to causes beyond the control of the TURF members, such as a
harmful algal bloom, it may be possible to reassign these individuals to a
reserve area that would operate as a “commons” to protect the fishers against
anomalous seasonal losses—at least as long as the reserve area is not too
distant from the original fishery.135
The success of restoration efforts within an MPA coupled with eventual
property rights within a TURF will depend largely on full implementation of
the previous policy suggestions for a moratorium and investment in
133
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enforcement. If industrial fishing activity is not temporarily halted within
the EEZs of West African States, then the coastal communities may find
themselves colliding with the industrial trawlers.136 The way to enforce the
moratorium will be through adequate equipment and well-trained
enforcement officials. The international finance community and national
enforcement officials with years of experience in combating crime on the
seas have an unprecedented opportunity in West Africa to protect
environmental security and food autonomy for the region. None of these
policy interventions are simple fixes because the story of the West African
fisheries has become a complex social saga acted out by profiteers, pirates,
corporate fleets, corrupt governments, lobbyists, and impoverished fishing
communities. In spite of the complexity, something must be done soon. The
negative trend for pelagic fish will continue until governments and
communities act rationally.137
VI. CONCLUSION
Scarcity is a systemic problem. With fisheries, it starts with State entities
such as the European Commission and the Chinese government, both of
which countenance irresponsible fishing on the part of private actors by
negotiating on their behalf to secure them special access to distant water
fisheries such as those discussed above. European and Chinese governments
rationalize their actions by thinking in terms of supply and demand for global
markets. For private corporate actors, the issue of physical scarcity in a
regional fishery may not require behavioral changes as long as there is room
for innovation that ensures profits in the global markets. Yet aquaculture
products are a poor economic substitute both for fish from the complex,
unique coastal ecosystems only located in West Africa and for the West
African communities whose cultures have historically been built around
marine fishing activities.
Yet the issue of scarcity extends beyond simply dwindling physical
resources. Accompanying the scarcity of a physical resource is frequently a
scarcity of other resources that are essential to address the physical scarcity
136
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problem. This Article has argued that while there may not be a scarcity of
national law for fishery management, there is a recurring scarcity of
enforcement of existing laws. West African States are unwilling to respond
to the scarcity problem due to corruption, or are unable to respond because of
a lack of vessels and trained enforcement staff. There is likewise a scarcity
of relevant policy for coastal fishery management that addresses the
livelihood concerns of coastal fishing communities. Without viable
alternatives to secure their livelihoods, fishing communities are being urged
by government ministries and NGOs to restrain fishing effort in order to
avert further stock collapses. Support for long-term community-based
ecological restoration projects might be the necessary policy intervention to
rebuild abundance, not just for the physical resources but also for the
families that depend on the resources.
International law has created many of the problems of dependency that
reveal themselves in the overexploitation of marine resources within the
West African region. Countries struggle with the burdens of their colonial
heritages, which include reliance upon developmental aid from other States
in order to create resource protection programs. In their pursuit of strategies
to protect their own citizen’s right to food, it is time for resource-consuming
States to recognize the extreme vulnerability of other States such as those in
West Africa as it relates to protecting their own populations’ interests in
fundamental food resources. International law provides opportunities for
disenfranchised States to regain autonomy over management of their own
resources. To the extent that a general international legal principle of
sustainability has emerged or may be emerging, other States may have
obligations both to cease supporting activities that undermine protection of
scarce resources and to offer support to create more robust conditions of
resource sustainability that allow States to help their populations realize their
right to food.138
A temporary moratorium on industrial fishing, targeted aid in the form of
enforcement vessels and enforcement officer training, and the creation a
system of TURFs are opportunities for international law and international
cooperation to support West African nations in their efforts to create “shared
understandings” that will restore abundance to their waters. Ultimately,
managing the fisheries of Western Africa is not about managing fish, but
about managing the myriad of human actors who come to the West African
138
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waters with different perceptions about what rules apply. In comparison to
fish, humans are a troublesome lot to manage; yet the power of collective
responsibility that is inherent in international law and that forms the basis for
many of the policy recommendations in this paper may still ensure a future
of abundant fisheries.

